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Abstract
We present a nonparametric ￿ revealed preference￿methodology for empiri-
cally analyzing collective consumption behavior. First, we introduce an integer
programming (IP) methodology for testing data consistency with collective con-
sumption models that account for publicly as well as privately consumed goods.
This IP methodology can include information on ￿ assignable quantities￿for pri-
vate goods. Next, we show that the IP methodology allows for recovering the
personalized (Lindahl) prices for the public goods and the personalized quan-
tities for the private goods. In turn, this implies recovery of the sharing rule
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1(i.e. personalized income share levels). Numerical examples and an empirical
application demonstrate the practical usefulness of the methodology.
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1. Introduction
We present a nonparametric ￿ revealed preference￿methodology for analyzing collec-
tive consumption behavior. This methodology allows for empirically testing data
consistency with collective consumption models and for empirically recovering the
structural decision model underlying the observed collectively rational consumption
behavior. This introductory section articulates our main contributions and relates
our ￿ndings to the existing literature.
Collective consumption models and the sharing rule. Collective con-
sumption models explicitly recognize that group (e.g. household) consumption is the
outcome of multi-person decision making, with each individual decision maker (e.g.
household member) characterized by her or his own rational preferences. Follow-
ing Chiappori (1988, 1992), they regard ￿ rational￿group consumption as the Pareto
e¢ cient outcome of a within-group bargaining process. This collective approach con-
trasts with the conventional unitary approach, which models groups as if they were
single decision makers. See Donni (2008) for a general discussion of collective con-
sumption models.
The fact that the collective approach starts from individual preferences (and not
group preferences) makes it particularly useful for addressing welfare-related questions
that speci￿cally focus on the within-group distribution of the group income. In this
respect, a concept that is intrinsically related to the collective approach is the so-called
￿ sharing rule￿ , which describes the way in which the group income is shared between
the individual members. Recovering this sharing rule can yield useful insights into
the distribution of the within-group bargaining power across the individual group
members; see, for example, Browning, Bourguignon, Chiappori and Lechene (1994),
Browning, Chiappori and Lewbel (2006) and Bourguignon, Browning and Chiappori
(2009). In what follows, an important focus will be on sharing rule recovery.
Nonparametric ￿ revealed preference￿conditions for collectively rational
2behavior. This study develops a methodology for nonparametric ￿ revealed prefer-
ence￿analysis of collective consumption models. In contrast to the traditional para-
metric approach, the nonparametric approach does not require some a priori (typi-
cally non-veri￿able) parametric/functional speci￿cation of the group decision process
(e.g. individual preferences and the sharing rule). See, for example, Afriat (1967),
Diewert (1973) and Varian (1982) for nonparametric revealed preference analysis of
the unitary consumption model.
We consider collective consumption models that allow for privately consumed
goods as well as publicly consumed goods. As for the privately consumed goods, we
consider the possible use of ￿ assignable quantity￿information in the nonparametric
revealed preference analysis. As a matter of fact, assignable quantity information
becomes increasingly available in budget surveys (e.g. Bonke and Browning, 2006),
and is often used in parametric applications of collective models (e.g. Browning,
Bourguignon, Chiappori and Lechene, 1994). We obtain necessary and su¢ cient
conditions for collectively rational behavior that can be formulated as 0-1 Integer
Programming (IP) constraints. These conditions enable checking consistency of a
given data set with particular collective consumption models. In the spirit of Varian
(1982), we will refer to this as ￿ testing￿data consistency with collective rationality.
Given our IP characterization, such testing boils down to verifying nonemptiness
of the feasible region of speci￿c IP problems. See Nemhauser and Wolsey (1999)
for a general discussion on solving IP problems. IP solvers have been included in
many present-day optimization software packages, which is particularly attractive for
practical applications.
At this point, it is useful to relate our next analysis to the one of Cherchye, De
Rock and Vermeulen (2007). Following Browning and Chiappori (1998), these authors
considered a collective consumption model that does not require a prior speci￿cation
of the (public or private) nature of the goods.1 By contrast, our focus is on models
that do start from such a speci￿cation. Such a prior speci￿cation is often realistic
in empirical applications of collective consumption models and is usually assumed
in existing (parametric) studies of these models. As for the objective of this study,
an important advantage of assuming this prior speci￿cation is that it enables us to
de￿ne data consistency tests that are both necessary and su¢ cient for collectively
1Browning and Chiappori (1998) originally established the parametric characterization of this
collective consumption model. See Chiappori and Ekeland (2006) for additional discussion.
3rational behavior. This implies a crucial di⁄erence with the results of Cherchye, De
Rock and Vermeulen (2007), who obtain a testable necessary condition and a testable
su¢ cient condition that in general do not coincide. In an earlier version of this study
(Cherchye, De Rock and Vermeulen, 2008a), we established the IP formulation of the
necessary condition of Cherchye, De Rock and Vermeulen (2007). For compactness,
we will abstract from a formal treatment here, but we do provide a brief discussion
in Section 3.4.
Nonparametric recovery of collective consumption models. Attractively,
our IP characterization will naturally allow for nonparametric ￿ revealed preference￿
recovery of the decision structure that underlies observed collectively rational group
behavior. Speci￿cally, such recovery identi￿es personalized quantities for the private
goods, personalized (Lindahl) prices for the public goods and the sharing rule (i.e.
personalized income share levels) from the observed group behavior alone. These
recovery questions are essentially the nonparametric counterparts of the so-called
￿ identi￿ability￿questions in the parametric literature; see Chiappori and Ekeland
(2009) for a general discussion on parametric identi￿ability of collective consumption
models.2
It is worth indicating that nonparametric recovery typically aims at identifying
the set of structural models that are consistent with a given set of observations. To il-
lustrate the di⁄erence between parametric and nonparametric recovery/identi￿ability,
let us consider the unitary model. For that model, a typical question concerns re-
covering the (structural model) parameters of a pre-speci￿ed utility function repre-
senting unique preferences from a set of demand (reduced form) parameters that are
estimated. By contrast, from a nonparametric perspective, there usually are many
preferences that make the same set of data consistent with the unitary model. There-
fore, nonparametric recovery of the unitary model focuses on identifying the set of
preferences that are consistent with a given data set; see, for example, Afriat (1967)
and Varian (1982 and 2006). In a similar sense, Blundell, Browning and Crawford
(2008) start from nonparametric (revealed preference) conditions on household behav-
2We note that Chiappori and Ekeland (2009) also call their identi￿ability notion a ￿ nonpara-
metric￿concept. However, in their context nonparametric has a very di⁄erent meaning than in
our context. Essentially, Chiappori and Ekeland￿ s notion of identi￿ability refers to the ability to
(uniquely) identify the group decision structure for a given parametric speci￿cation of the group
decision process. By contrast, our notion of nonparametric recovery refers to (set) identifying the
group decision structure without reference to such a parametric speci￿cation.
4ior to set identify household demand responses in the context of the unitary model.3
A main contribution of the current study is that we develop ￿ set identi￿cation￿results
for the collective model.
It is interesting to compare our following results on nonparametric recovery of
collective consumption models with the corresponding results on parametric recov-
ery/identi￿ability in Chiappori and Ekeland (2009). An important di⁄erence is that
Chiappori and Ekeland need the presence of a so-called ￿ exclusive good￿(i.e. a good
that bene￿ts the utility of only one group member) as a condition for parametric
identi￿ability; information on an exclusive good is a speci￿c instance of what we
will call assignable quantity information. By contrast, we will demonstrate that pre-
cise nonparametric recovery of the collective consumption model (obtaining tight set
identi￿cation) is possible even in the absence of assignable quantity information (e.g.
information on an exclusive good). In addition, whereas the parametric approach
typically recovers group members￿income shares (i.e. the sharing rule) up to a con-
stant under the assumption of exclusive goods, our numerical examples will show
the possibility to nonparametrically identify tight sets of income share levels even
if no assignable quantity information can be used. A possible explanation is that
Chiappori and Ekeland adopt a so-called ￿ di⁄erentiable￿approach in their paramet-
ric set-up and focus on ￿ local￿conditions for collective rationality. By contrast, the
revealed preference conditions on which we focus are global by construction.
Structure. Section 2 gives a formal introduction to the collective consumption
models on which we focus. Section 3 presents the revealed preference approach to an-
alyzing collectively rational consumption behavior. Most notably, this includes the IP
methodology that allows for testing data consistency with the collective consumption
model and for obtaining recovery results in practical applications. Section 4 gives
some fully worked numerical examples that illustrate the IP methodology. These
examples also show that the methodology can obtain precise recovery (i.e. tight
set identi￿cation) even if no assignable quantity information can be used. Section 5
presents an empirical application to a sample of couples drawn from the Russia Lon-
gitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS). The application serves three purposes. Firstly,
we will check data consistency with various collective consumption models where the
3These authors also discuss the relationship between this type of revealed preference analysis and
the emerging literature on ￿ partial identi￿cation￿(e.g., Manski, 2003, and Chernozhukov, Hong and
Tamer, 2007).
5nature (public or private) of the goods is known a priori. Secondly, we will provide
sharing rule recovery results for the di⁄erent models under consideration. Thirdly, we
will illustrate the usefulness of assignable quantity information. Section 6 provides a
concluding discussion.
2. Rational collective consumption behavior
Throughout, we consider a group (e.g. household) consisting of M group members
(e.g. household members). We focus on a setting with N privately consumed goods
and K publicly consumed goods. The vector q 2 RN
+ represents the quantities that
are privately consumed by the group and the vector Q 2 RK
+ represents the publicly
consumed quantities. Next, the vector qm 2 RN
+ represents privately consumed quan-
tities for each member m, with
XM
m=1 qm = q. We assume that the preferences of
every member m can be represented by a non-satiated utility function Um (qm;Q).
The empirical analyst observes T group choices characterized by prices and quan-
tities. For each observation t 2 f1; :::; Tg, pt 2 RN
++ and qt 2 RN
+ denote the prices
and (group) quantities for the private goods, and Pt 2 RK
++ and Qt 2 RK
+ denote the
prices and quantities for the public goods. In general, however, the empirical analyst
does not know which quantities are privately consumed by the individual group mem-
bers, i.e. qm
t is unobserved. If we observe how much a group member consumes of a
private good, we say this good is ￿ assignable￿ ; see Bourguignon, Browning and Chiap-
pori (2009). Formally, for each member m and observation t, we de￿ne the (observed)
assignable quantities qAm
t 2 RN








Speci￿c examples of assignable goods are so-called ￿ exclusive goods￿ , i.e. goods that
exclusively bene￿t the utility of single group members. More generally, assignable
quantity information can pertain to a subset of group members and/or (private)
goods. See also our empirical application in Section 5.










6In practical applications we often have
XM
m=1 qAm
t 6= qt, i.e. some private con-
sumption cannot be assigned prior to the analysis. It is even possible that qAm
t = 0,
i.e. no assignable information at all is available. Therefore, we will consider feasible
personalized quantities qm
t .
De￿nition 1. Let S be a set of observations. For each observation t, feasible per-
sonalized quantities qm
t 2 RN






Using the concept of feasible personalized quantities, we can de￿ne the condition
for a collective rationalization of a set of observations S. This condition basically
requires that the observed group consumption can be represented as a Pareto e¢ cient
outcome of some within-group bargaining process.
De￿nition 2. Let S be a set of observations. A combination of M utility functions
U1;:::;UM provides a collective rationalization of S if for each observation t there
exist feasible personalized quantities qm
t and weights ￿m
















for all zm 2 RN
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Thus, a collective rationalization of S requires that there exists, for each observa-
tion t, feasible personalized quantities qm
t that maximize a weighted sum of the group
members￿utilities Um for the given group budget p0
tqt + P0
tQt: Each Pareto weight
￿m
t represents the ￿ bargaining power￿of member m in observation t: See, for example,
Browning and Chiappori (1998) for a detailed discussion.
One ￿nal remark is in order. Strictly speaking, the utility function Um (qm;Q)
excludes consumption externalities for the privately consumed goods. Importantly,
however, our setting can actually account for such externalities. Speci￿cally, suppose
a private good n is exclusively consumed by member m and characterized by exter-
nalities (e.g. male clothing or female clothing). Then, we account for externalities
for member m￿ s private consumption of good n by formally treating this good as a
public good. As such, although we will not always indicate this explicitly in what fol-
lows, the quantities qm must be understood as privately consumed quantities without
externalities, and private quantities with externalities can be included in Q.
73. Revealed preference analysis
We will ￿rst introduce a revealed preference condition for collectively rational con-
sumption behavior. This condition is nonparametric in the sense that it does not re-
quire a prior parametric speci￿cation of the member-speci￿c utilities Um and weights
￿m. The condition will allow us to nonparametrically de￿ne the sharing rule con-
cept that is intrinsic to the collective consumption model. As we will indicate, this
￿rst nonparametric characterization of collective rationality is not directly useful in
practical analysis. Therefore, we also introduce an equivalent characterization in in-
teger programming (IP) terms, which does permit practical analysis. Speci￿cally,
this IP condition allows for consistency testing and for recovering the collective de-
cision model (including the sharing rule) that underlies observed collectively rational
consumption behavior.
3.1. Nonparametric characterization
To de￿ne the nonparametric condition for a collective rationalization of a set S, we
￿rst de￿ne feasible personalized prices. Essentially, these personalized prices capture
the fraction of the aggregate prices for the publicly consumed quantities that is borne
by the di⁄erent group members. For each public good k 2 f1;:::;Kg, the correspond-
ing personalized prices must add up to the observed price and can thus be interpreted
as Lindahl prices.
De￿nition 3. Let S be a set of observations. For each observation t, feasible per-
sonalized prices Pm
t 2 RK




We next specify the Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference (GARP), which
we adapt to our speci￿c setting. Varian (1982) introduced the GARP condition for
individually rational behavior under observed prices and quantities; i.e. he showed
that it is a necessary and su¢ cient nonparametric condition for the observed quantity
choices to maximize a single non-satiated utility function under the given budget
constraint. We focus on the same condition in terms of feasible personalized prices
and quantities; the next Proposition 1 will establish that collective rationality as
de￿ned in De￿nition 2 requires GARP consistency for each individual member m.
8De￿nition 4. Consider feasible personalized prices and quantities for a set of obser-
vations S. For m 2 f1;:::;Mg, the set f(pt;Pm
t ;qm
t ;Qt); t = 1;:::;Tg satis￿es GARP
if there exist relations Rm














s ;Qs) R0 (qm
u ;Qu) ; (qm
u ;Qu) R0 (qm
v ;Qv) ; :::; (qm
z ;Qz) R0 (qm
t ;Qt) for some
(possibly empty) sequence (u; v; :::; z) then (qm
s ;Qs) R (qm
t ;Qt);
(iii) if (qm
s ;Qs) R (qm









We can now provide a nonparametric characterization of collectively rational be-
havior. (The appendix contains the proofs of our main results.)
Proposition 1. Let S be a set of observations. The following conditions are equiv-
alent:
(i) there exists a combination of M concave and continuous utility functions U1; :::;
UM that provide a collective rationalization of S;
(ii) there exist feasible personalized prices and quantities such that for each member
m = 1; :::; M, the set f(pt;Pm
t ;qm
t ;Qt); t = 1;:::;Tg satis￿es GARP;
(iii) there exist feasible personalized prices and quantities, numbers Um
j > 0 and
￿
m




















] for each member m = 1; :::; M.
Condition (ii) states that collective rationality requires individual rationality (i.e.
GARP consistency) of each member m in terms of personalized prices and quantities;
and condition (iii) gives the equivalent ￿ Afriat inequalities￿(see Varian, 1982, for
extensive discussion in the context of the unitary model). In general, however, the
true personalized prices and quantities are unobserved. Therefore, it is only imposed
that there must exist at least one set of feasible personalized prices and quantities
that satis￿es the condition. In what follows, we will mainly focus on condition (ii).
3.2. Sharing rule
Importantly in view of our further discussion, the result in Proposition 1 also allows
for the following decentralized interpretation of collective rationality: collective ratio-
nality at the group level requires individual rationality at the member level. Given
9this, collectively rational consumption behavior can also be represented as the out-
come of a two-step allocation procedure: in the ￿rst step, the so-called sharing rule
distributes the aggregate group income across the group members; in the second step,
each member maximizes her/his utility subject to the resulting income share and ac-
counting for the member￿ s personalized prices. This second step corresponds to the
GARP condition (ii) in Proposition 1, which e⁄ectively implies that each member be-
haves utility maximizing in terms of a member-speci￿c utility function Um (Varian,
1982). Of course, we are not assuming that groups explicitly use the sharing rule.
The two-step representation simply states that the outcome of the group allocation
process can be characterized in this way.
In formal terms, we can restate the collective rationalization condition in De￿ni-
tion 2 as follows: a combination of utility functions U1; :::; UM provides a collective
rationalization of S if for each observation t there exist feasible personalized prices




t ;Qt) ￿ U
m (z
m;Z)
for all zm 2 RN
















This member-speci￿c utility maximization condition corresponds to the second step of
the two-step representation introduced above. As for the ￿rst step, the income share




0 Qt. This income
share corresponds to a sharing rule underlying the observed group behavior.






which are de￿ned for every set of feasible personalized prices and quantities that
yields a collective rationalization of S.
De￿nition 5. Consider feasible personalized prices and quantities for a set of obser-
vations S such that each set f(pt;Pm
t ;qm
t ;Qt); t = 1;:::;Tg, m = 1; :::; M; satis￿es
GARP. For yt = p0
tqt + P0
tQt the group income at observation t, the feasible income






We remark that this decentralized representation of collectively rational behavior,
10which follows from the Pareto e¢ ciency assumption regarding the group bargaining
process, is formally similar to the well-known decentralization result regarding col-
lective rationality when public goods are excluded; see Chiappori (1988, 1992).4 An
important di⁄erence of the approach followed in this study is that each member m￿ s
preferences may depend not only on her or his own private consumption, but also
on the public consumption (implying that personalized Lindahl prices can di⁄er from
observed market prices). Intuitively, the part of member m￿ s income share associ-
ated with the publicly consumed quantities ((Pm
t )
0 Qt) re￿ ects the extent to which
these public quantities comply with the member￿ s preferences for the public goods
(as captured by the Lindahl prices Pm
t ).
The sharing rule is a core concept in this two-step representation. It can be inter-
preted as an indicator for the bargaining power of the individual group members: a
higher relative income share of member m (ym
t =yt) is then regarded as an indication of
increased bargaining power for that member; see, for example, Browning, Chiappori
and Lewbel (2006). The sharing rule concept is particularly useful in applications,
because it is independent of cardinal representations of preferences (in contrast to the
bargaining weights ￿m
t in De￿nition 2). Given this useful interpretation, a main ques-
tion in what follows concerns the nonparametric recovery of feasible income shares.
We emphasize that one must be careful in drawing welfare conclusions on the basis
of the income shares ym
t when public goods are involved. Because the personalized
(Lindahl) prices for the public goods are endogenous, the welfare interpretation of
the sharing rule is more complex with public goods than without public goods. For
example, suppose that a reform increases member m￿ s income share for given prices
of the private goods, but at the same time member m￿ s personalized (Lindahl) prices
for the public goods also increase. Then, it is not directly clear from member m￿ s
income share (calculated with Lindahl prices for the public goods) whether she or he
e⁄ectively gains from the reform.
However, it is possible to test speci￿c hypotheses regarding the relationship be-
tween the income share of member m and the welfare/utility level of that member.
For example, suppose two observations s and t (e.g. with constant prices for the
4In the parametric approach, a re￿nement of the standard sharing rule concept that accounts for
public goods is the so-called ￿ conditional sharing rule￿ . This concept captures how the group shares
the income for private consumption for the given level of public consumption. As such, in contrast
to our sharing rule concept, it does not directly incorporate Lindahl prices for the public goods. See,
for example, Blundell, Chiappori and Meghir (2005) for discussion.
11private goods, ps = pt) and we hypothesize that a higher income share for member
m in observation s e⁄ectively corresponds to a higher utility level for that member in











We will discuss how to test such a hypothesis by means of the IP methodology intro-
duced next.
3.3. Integer programming characterization and recovery analysis
From the perspective of practical applications, conditions (ii) and (iii) in Proposition
1 are not directly useful, because they are expressed in terms of unobserved prices Pm
t
and quantities qm
t . First, as for the GARP consistency condition (ii), we note that
given prices pt and quantities qt and Qt de￿ne in￿nitely many feasible speci￿cations
of these personalized prices and quantities. Any such feasible speci￿cation de￿nes
di⁄erent relations Rm
0 and Rm in the GARP consistency condition. Next, the ￿ Afriat





Given this, we provide an equivalent integer programming (IP) characterization of
collectively rational consumption behavior.5 Speci￿cally, we reformulate condition (ii)
in Proposition 1 in IP terms. Attractively, this IP formulation does allow for practical
analysis. It enables us to use solution algorithms that are specially tailored for such
problems (see, for example, Nemhauser and Wolsey, 1999). Our own application in
Section 5 provides a speci￿c illustration.
To obtain the IP formulation, we de￿ne the binary variables xm
st 2 f0;1g, with
xm
st = 1 interpreted as ￿ (qm
s ;Qs) Rm (qm
t ;Qt)￿for a given speci￿cation of feasible
personalized prices and quantities. We then have the following result.
Proposition 2. Let S be a set of observations. There exists a combination of M
concave and continuous utility functions U1; :::; UM that provide a collective rational-





t 2 R+ and xm
st 2 f0;1g,





5Strictly speaking, the characterization of collectively rational behavior in Proposition 2 obtains





































￿ yt (1 ￿ xm
st):
The interpretation of the di⁄erent constraints is the following. Constraints (i)-(iii)
directly follow from De￿nitions 1, 3 and 5 of feasible personalized prices, quantities
and income shares. The following constraints (iv)-(vi) correspond, for each member










, then we must have xm
st = 1 (which corresponds
to (qm
s ;Qs) Rm (qm
t ;Qt)).6 Next, constraint (v) imposes transitivity, i.e. xm
su = 1
((qm
s ;Qs) Rm (qm
u ;Qu)) and xm
ut = 1 ((qm
u ;Qu) Rm (qm
t ;Qt)) imply xm
st = 1 ((qm
s ;Qs)
Rm (qm
t ;Qt)). Finally, constraint (vi) requires that, if xm
st = 1 ((qm












As such, Proposition 2 de￿nes an operational necessary and su¢ cient test for
collective rationality. If the IP constraints (i)-(vi) characterize an empty feasible
region for the given data set, then a collective rationalization of the data is impossible.
Conversely, if the IP constraints characterize a non-empty feasible region, then a
collective rationalization of the data is certainly possible.
Importantly, Proposition 2 also implies an operational way for nonparametrically
recovering feasible personalized prices, quantities and income shares that provide a
collective rationalization of the set S. Speci￿cally, for each member m it identi￿es
feasible sets of personalized prices, quantities and income shares as (non-empty) fea-
sible sets (of, respectively, Pm
t , qm
t ,ym
t ) characterized by the constraints (i)-(vi) in
Proposition 2. Our Examples 1 and 2 in Section 4 and the empirical application in
Section 5 will illustrate this recovery.
To conclude, we return to our above discussion on the welfare interpretation of
the income shares ym
t . Speci￿cally, it may be interesting to check whether a higher
income share for member m e⁄ectively implies a higher welfare (or utility) level for










st is di¢ cult to use in IP analysis. Therefore,









+ ￿ ￿ ysxm
st for ￿ (> 0) arbitrarily small.








The interpretation is analogous to before: if member m￿ s income share in observation
s exceeds member m￿ s income share in member observation t (ym
s ￿ ym
t ), then we
must have xm
st = 1 ((qm
s ;Qs)Rm (qm
t ;Qt)). Testing the hypothesis adds (3.2) to
the constraints (i)-(vi) in Proposition 2. If the resulting IP problem de￿nes a non-
empty feasible region, then we cannot reject the hypothesis (3.1). More generally,
this speci￿c application illustrates the ￿ exibility of the IP methodology in terms of
testing alternative hypotheses about preference orderings (captured by the variables
xm
st) and the sharing rule (captured by the variables ym
t ). See Section 4 for some
additional examples.
3.4. Impure goods
So far, we have focused on collective consumption models that explicitly distinguish
between public and private goods. This helped to focus our discussion. Also, these
models are usually considered in empirical applications (including our own application
in Section 5).
Of course, in general some goods may serve di⁄erent uses simultaneously. For
example, expenditures on ￿ car use￿may include a public element (e.g. car use for
a family trip) and a private element (e.g. car use for work). This implies ￿ impure
goods￿ , which are partly publicly and partly privately consumed. Clearly, if the
empirical analyst observes the privately and publicly consumed components of each
good, then one can use the same methodology as before. In that case, the privately
consumed component and the publicly consumed component of every impure good
are formally treated as di⁄erent goods.
However, it is well possible that impure goods have private and public components
that are not separately observed. To account for this, Browning and Chiappori (1998)
introduced a collective consumption model that does not require a prior assumption
regarding the public or private nature of goods. Cherchye, De Rock and Vermeulen
(2007) consider the nonparametric characterization of this model. They present a
testable nonparametric condition that is necessary for data consistency with the model
as well as a complementary su¢ cient condition. In general, the necessary condition
14and the su¢ cient condition do not coincide.
In an earlier version of this study (Cherchye, De Rock and Vermeulen, 2008a),
we established the IP formulation of the necessary condition in Cherchye, De Rock
and Vermeulen (2007). This IP condition has a formally similar structure as the IP
condition in Proposition 2. We showed that this IP characterization provides a useful
basis for recovering the sharing rule in the case one does not use a prior speci￿cation of
the (public or private) nature of the goods. A numerical example similar to Examples
1 and 2 in Section 4 demonstrated that this IP method can obtain precise recovery
(i.e. tight sets of feasible income shares) even when the number of observations is
small (in casu T = 3). Cherchye, De Rock, Sabbe and Vermeulen (2008) provided an
empirical application of this IP methodology.
As a concluding remark, we indicate that the use of a necessary condition for
collective rationality as a starting point for recovery analysis entails a subtle but im-
portant di⁄erence with the type of recovery analysis discussed before. In particular,
a feasible income share for member m that satis￿es the necessary condition must
no longer necessarily correspond to a collective consumption model that e⁄ectively
rationalizes the data. This is in sharp contrast with the recovery results based on
the necessary and su¢ cient condition for collective rationality in Proposition 2: if
a feasible income share respects this condition, then there certainly exists a corre-
sponding speci￿cation of feasible personalized prices and quantities that collectively
rationalizes the observed set S.
4. Numerical examples
We illustrate the IP methodology by means of two fully worked examples. Inter-
estingly, these examples demonstrate that the methodology can obtain precise non-
parametric recovery (i.e. tight sets of feasible income shares, personalized prices
and personalized quantities) even when the number of observations is small (in casu
T = 3) and no assignable quantity information can be used (i.e. qAm
t = 0 for all m
and t). These tight sets can be identi￿ed because there is a large variation in the
observed prices and aggregate quantities. In general, for a given price-quantity varia-
tion, we can -of course- expect the sets to become tighter when more information can
be used (e.g. because T gets larger or qAm
t > 0 for some m and t). Such additional
information can also include speci￿c hypotheses about the decision structure under-
15lying observed group behavior (in casu the sharing rule, feasible personalized prices
and the feasible personalized quantities). In fact, as also shown in the examples, our
approach allows for testing such assumptions.
In this section, we will focus on two limiting speci￿cations of the collective model in
De￿nition 2. These models impose speci￿c a priori structure on the group behavior:
(1) the model in which all goods are public, and (2) the model in which all goods
are private. Focusing on these two cases helps to structure our discussion. Evidently,
examples with some goods private and other goods public can be constructed in a
directly analogous manner.
4.1. All consumption public
Example 1 considers the case in which all goods are publicly consumed and, thus,
there is no private consumption (N = 0). In terms of the general condition for
collective rationality in De￿nition 2, this means that we consider member-speci￿c
utility functions Um (qm;Q) = V m (Q). It is worth emphasizing that this setting is
more general than may seem at ￿rst sight. Stricto sensu, the mere implication is that
the (observed) aggregate quantities (fully) enter all utility functions. As discussed
at the end of Section 2, this allows for private consumption with externalities of a
particular good n by member m as long as that good n is exclusively consumed by
that member m.
Example 1. Consider a two-member household (M = 2) that consumes three goods
(K = 3). Suppose three observations with quantities and prices (for 0 < ￿ < 1)7
Q1 = (1;0;0)
0 ;P1 = (1 + ￿;1;￿=2)
0 ;
Q2 = (0;1;0)
0 ;P2 = (1;1 + ￿;￿=2)
0 ;
Q3 = (0;0;1)
0 ;P3 = (0:5 + ￿=2;0:5 + ￿=2;1)
0 :
7We emphasize that we use zero quantities only for mathematical elegance. Of course, this use
of zero quantities does not a⁄ect the core of our arguments in this and the following example.
16As a preliminary step, we note that these prices and quantities imply
y1 = 1 + ￿; P
0
1Q2 = 1; P
0
1Q3 = ￿=2;
y2 = 1 + ￿; P
0
2Q1 = 1; P
0
2Q3 = ￿=2;
y3 = 1; P
0
3Q1 = 0:5 + ￿=2; P
0
3Q2 = 0:5 + ￿=2:
Step 1. We ￿rst consider the restrictions on the binary variables x1
st and x2
st (s;t
2 f1;2;3g, s 6= t) for the current data. As a ￿rst result, we must have x1
st = 1 or
x2

















￿0 Qt < ysx
2
st:
Combining these two constraints, and using that Ps=P1
s+P2














and thus, because ys > P0
sQt, we necessarily have x1
st = 1 or x2
st = 1 for any s and t.
As a second result, we obtain that xm
st = 1 implies xl
ts = 1 (m;l 2 f1;2g; m 6= l)
for any s and t. Speci￿cally, for xm











t, yt = y1
t + y2










Qs, and thus x
l
ts = 1 because of constraint (iv).
As a third result, we cannot have x1
st = 1 and x2
st = 1 for any s and t. If x1
st = 1
and x2















￿0 Qs ￿ 0:
17In turn, using Pt=P1
t + P2






which is excluded because yt > P0
tQs.
As a fourth result, we cannot have (i) xm
21 = 1 and xl
31 = 1 or (ii) xm
12 = 1 and
xl
32 = 1 (m 6= l): For example, consider xm
21 = 1 and xl
31 = 1. (The argument for
xm
12 = 1 and xl




















which is excluded because y1 > P0
1 (Q2 + Q3) and, by construction, P0








Given these four results, we necessarily obtain xm
13 = xm
12 = xm




31 = 1. It is easily veri￿ed that this speci￿cation satis￿es the necessary and
su¢ cient condition in Proposition 2, i.e. the corresponding feasible region de￿ned by
constraints (i)-(vi) is non-empty.
Step 2. Next, we consider recovery of the sharing rule. Using constraint (vi) in
Proposition 2 (together with P0
3Q1 ￿ (Pm
3 )





￿0 Q2, which hold
by construction), we obtain
x
m




3Q1 = 0:5 + ￿=2 ) y
l
3 = y3 ￿ y
m
3 ￿ 0:5 ￿ ￿=2;
x
l




3Q2 = 0:5 + ￿=2 ) y
m
3 = y3 ￿ y
l
3 ￿ 0:5 ￿ ￿=2;











2Q3 = ￿=2 ) y
l
2 = y2 ￿ y
m
2 ￿ 1 ￿ ￿=2;
x
l




1Q3 = ￿=2 ) y
m
1 = y1 ￿ y
l
1 ￿ 1 ￿ ￿=2;
which again obtains tight sets of ym
t and yl
t (t = 1;2) when ￿ gets small. For example,
￿ arbitrarily close to zero yields ym
1 ￿ 1, yl
1 ￿ 0 and ym
2 ￿ 0, yl
2 ￿ 1.
18Two remarks are in order. First, this result can be interpreted in terms of ￿ bargain-
ing power￿of the individual members, for which the sharing rule can be interpreted as
an indicator. Speci￿cally, consider ￿ arbitrarily small. In that case, member m can be
conceived as the (quasi) ￿ dictator￿in situation 1 (i.e. member m is solely responsible
for the full household budget or ym
1 ￿ y1) while the other member l is the ￿ dictator￿
in situation 2 (yl
2 ￿ y2); in situation 3, ￿nally, the aggregate income is split equally
over the two members (y1
3 ￿ y2
3 ￿ 0:5y3).
Second, the proposed method allows for imposing a whole series of additional
restrictions on the sharing rule (or, alternatively, for testing speci￿c hypotheses about
the sharing rule). For instance, suppose that in our current example we impose (or
assume) that the feasible income share of the husband (member 1) is higher than
that of the wife (member 2) in situation 1, i.e. y1
1 ￿ y2
1. This immediately obtains
1 ￿ ￿=2 ￿ y1
1 ￿ 1, 0 ￿ y2
1 ￿ ￿=2 and 0 ￿ y1
2 ￿ ￿=2, 1 ￿ ￿=2 ￿ y2
2 ￿ 1; and,
thus, for ￿ arbitrarily small the mere restriction y1
1 ￿ y2
1 implies that the husband
is the ￿ dictator￿in situation 1 (y1
1 ￿ y1) and the wife is the ￿ dictator￿in situation 2
(y2
2 ￿ y2). Alternatively, one can put upper and lower bounds (or test corresponding
assumptions) on the relative income share of some member m in situation t, i.e. ym
t ￿
ym
t =yt ￿ ym
t for ym
t , ym
t 2 [0;1]. For instance, our result implies that any lower bound
ym
t > ￿=2 for some m and all t will be rejected for this speci￿c data structure. Finally,
additional sharing rule restrictions can impose a speci￿c relationship between feasible
income shares of the same member m in di⁄erent situations (e.g. time periods). For
instance, suppose that we assume in the current example that the feasible income
share of the husband must be higher in situation 1 than in situation 2, i.e. y1
1 ￿ y1
2;
this directly obtains 1 ￿ ￿=2 ￿ y1
1 ￿ 1, 0 ￿ y1
2 ￿ ￿=2 and 0 ￿ y2
1 ￿ ￿=2, 1 ￿ ￿=2 ￿
y2
2 ￿ 1.
Step 3. Let us then consider recovery of the feasible personalized (Lindahl) prices.
As a starting point, we use our conclusion for the feasible income shares, which can
be summarized as
1 ￿ ￿=2 ￿ y
m





2 ￿ ￿=2 and 1 ￿ ￿=2 ￿ y
l
2 ￿ 1 + ￿;
0:5 ￿ ￿=2 ￿ y
1
3 ￿ 0:5 + ￿=2 and 0:5 ￿ ￿=2 ￿ y
2
3 ￿ 0:5 + ￿=2:
19For the given data structure, this implies (for (Pm
t )k the k-th entry of Pm
t )
1 ￿ ￿=2 ￿ (P
m















2 ￿ 1 + ￿;












3 ￿ 0:5 + ￿=2:






t when ￿ gets
arbitrarily small. To illustrate the impact of additional structure, suppose that
(P1
1)1 > (P2
1)1, i.e. the husband contributes more to the ￿rst good in situation 1.
For ￿ arbitrarily small, this mere restriction implies that the husband ￿ pays￿(quasi)
everything of the ￿rst good in situation 1 ((P1
1)1 ￿ (P1)1), while the wife pays every-
thing of the second good in situation 2 ((P2
2)2 ￿ (P2)2); ￿nally, in situation 3 the
expenditure for the third good is equally split ((P1
3)3 ￿ (P2
3)3 ￿ 0:5(P3)3).
4.2. All consumption private
Example 2 considers the case that excludes public consumption (K = 0). In other
words, all consumption is private. This model is commonly referred to as the ￿ ego-
istic￿model in the literature on collective consumption behavior. In terms of the
general condition for collective rationality in De￿nition 2, this means that we con-
sider member-speci￿c utility functions Um (qm;Q) = V m (qm). At this point, it is
worth noting that this case actually also encompasses a wider class of member-speci￿c
utilities that model ￿ altruism￿in a speci￿c way: it also includes so-called ￿ caring prefer-
ences￿ , which correspond to utility functions Um (qm;Q) = W m ￿
V 1 (q1);:::;V M ￿
qM￿￿
that depend not only on member m￿ s own ￿ egoistic￿utility but also on the other
member l￿ s utility de￿ned in terms of ql. Chiappori (1992) argues that every Pareto
e¢ cient outcome in terms of caring preferences (W m) is also Pareto e¢ cient in terms
of egoistic preferences (V m). In other words, under Pareto e¢ ciency the empirical
implications of caring preferences are indistinguishable from those of egoistic prefer-
ences.
Example 2. We recapture the situation of Example 1, with corresponding observed
prices and quantities. In this case all goods are privately consumed so that N = 3
20and
q1 = (1;0;0)
0 ;p1 = (1 + ￿;1;￿=2)
0 ;
q2 = (0;1;0)
0 ;p2 = (1;1 + ￿;￿=2)
0 ;
q3 = (0;0;1)
0 ;p3 = (0:5 + ￿=2;0:5 + ￿=2;1)
0 :
We note that this example does not include assignable quantity information.
As for the feasible income shares, an analogous reasoning as in Steps 1 and 2 of
Example 1 yields the conclusion (for m 6= l)
1 ￿ ￿=2 ￿ y
m





2 ￿ ￿=2 and 1 ￿ ￿=2 ￿ y
l
2 ￿ 1 + ￿;
0:5 ￿ ￿=2 ￿ y
1
3 ￿ 0:5 + ￿=2 and 0:5 ￿ ￿=2 ￿ y
2
3 ￿ 0:5 + ￿=2:
Focusing on the feasible personalized quantities, this implies (using constraint (iv),
for (qm
t )n the n-th entry of qm
t )
1 ￿ ￿=2 ￿ (1 + ￿)(q
m







0 ￿ (1 + ￿)(q
m






2 ￿ 1 + ￿;












3 ￿ 0:5 + ￿=2:
We thus obtain
(1 ￿ ￿=2)=(1 + ￿) ￿ (q
m






1 ￿ ￿=(2(1 + ￿));
0 ￿ (q
m






2 ￿ 1=(1 + ￿);












3 ￿ 0:5 + ￿=2:






t when ￿ gets arbitrar-
ily small. To illustrate the impact of additional structure, suppose that (q1
1)1 > (q2
1)1,
i.e. the husband consumes more of the ￿rst good in situation 1. For ￿ arbitrarily
small, this sole restriction immediately obtains that the husband consumes (quasi)
everything of the ￿rst good in situation 1 ((q1
1)1 ￿ (q1)1), while the wife consumes
21everything of the second good in situation 2 ((q2
2)2 ￿ (q2)2); ￿nally, in situation 3 the




We apply the IP methodology to data drawn from the Russia Longitudinal Moni-
toring Survey (RLMS). Cherchye, De Rock and Vermeulen (2008b) studied the same
data set. These authors concluded consistency of these data with the collective con-
sumption model of Browning and Chiappori (1998), which does not use a prior spec-
i￿cation of the (public or private) nature of each good (see Section 3.4). Speci￿cally,
they tested the revealed preference conditions for this model established by Cherchye,
De Rock and Vermeulen (2007).
We extend the study of Cherchye, De Rock and Vermeulen (2008b) in several
respects. Firstly, we will focus on various collective consumption models that do
label each good as public or private a priori. As discussed in the previous sections,
we have necessary and su¢ cient conditions for data consistency with these models,
and these conditions in turn allow for nonparametric recovery (i.e. set identi￿cation)
by means of the IP methodology. In particular, we will consider two limiting collective
models (with, respectively, all goods public and all goods private; see also Section 4)
as well as a more realistic, intermediate model (with some goods public and other
goods private). Secondly, we will illustrate the IP recovery methodology for these
three models. More speci￿cally, we will discuss nonparametric recovery results for
the sharing rule.8 This part of the application will learn us more about how the
set identi￿cation works in practice and how sensitive the results are to the model
speci￿cation. Thirdly, our application will also consider the use of assignable quantity
information for privately consumed goods. We will provide results for di⁄erent degrees
of assignability. However, since assignable quantity information is not available in the
RLMS data, we are bound to introduce this information in some ad-hoc fashion. As
such, our results here will be mainly illustrative.
At this point, it is worth emphasizing that assignable quantity information does
become increasingly incorporated in household budget surveys. See, for example,
8For compactness, we will restrict to sharing rule recovery in what follows. Recovery of per-
sonalized prices (for publicly consumed goods) and personalized quantities (for privately consumed
goods) proceeds analogously as in Examples 1 and 2 in Section 4.
22Bonke and Browning (2006), who discuss a household survey with detailed infor-
mation on who consumes what in the household. In this respect, we also remark
that assignable quantity information is easily obtained in the context of experimental
data. See, for example, Bruyneel, Cherchye and De Rock (2008), who provide an
analysis of collective consumption models on the basis of experimentally gathered
data. As a matter of fact, it has been argued that the nonparametric revealed prefer-
ence methodology is particularly useful in combination with such experimental data.
See, for example, Sippel (1997), Harbaugh, Krause and Berry (2001) and Andreoni
and Miller (2002) for earlier applications that experimentally analyze individually
rational behavior.
5.1. Data
Our sample consists of 148 adult couples (M = 2) drawn from the RLMS. No house-
hold contains other persons such as children and/or siblings, and in each household
both the female member and the male member are employed. Our next analysis will
consider each of the 148 households separately, which avoids (often debatable) prefer-
ence homogeneity assumptions across male or female members of di⁄erent households.
Our data set covers the period from 1994 to 2003. We have consumption data
for each year except for the years 1997 and 1999, so that we end up with 8 (= T)
observations (prices and quantities) per household. We consider bundles consisting of
21 (= N +K) nondurable goods: (1) food outside the home, (2) clothing, (3) car fuel,
(4) wood fuel, (5) gas fuel, (6) luxury goods, (7) services, (8) housing rent, (9) bread,
(10) potatoes, (11) vegetables, (12) fruit, (13) meat, (14) dairy products, (15) fat,
(16) sugar, (17) eggs, (18) ￿sh, (19) other food items, (20) alcohol and (21) tobacco.
See Table A.1 for a summary. We refer to Cherchye, De Rock and Vermeulen (2008b)
for a more detailed discussion of the data.
As indicated above, we will focus on three di⁄erent speci￿cations of the collective
consumption model. As a ￿rst exercise, we will consider the two limiting speci￿cations
that were also considered in Section 4: the ￿rst model assumes that all goods are
publicly consumed (K = 21), and the second model imposes that all consumption is
private and does not use assignable quantity information (N = 21). However, it is
clear from the above set of goods that none of these limiting cases is very realistic for
the current application. Therefore, we will also consider a model with public goods
as well as private goods: wood fuel, gas fuel and housing rent are public (K = 3),
23and the other goods are private (N = 18). Given the characteristics of the modeled
goods, this choice is probably quite close to reality.
As for this model with 3 public and 18 private goods, we will provide results for
di⁄erent degrees of assignable quantity information. When doing so, we will start
from an (admittedly extreme) base scenario that assumes qAm
t = qm
t , i.e. the within-
household distribution of the privately consumed goods is fully known. In subsequent
steps, we will consider less and less assignability, i.e. we account for (ever larger)
deviations from the base scenario distribution (or, qAm
t < qm
t ). Formally, using qBm
t







with 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1. The parameter ￿ captures the extent to which we allow for devia-
tions from the base scenario distribution, and thus accounts for imperfect assignable
quantity information. For example, ￿ = 1 implies qAm
t = qBm
t , while ￿ < 1 implies
qAm
t < qBm
t . Generally, lower ￿ values imply less stringent restrictions for the pri-
vate quantities. Varying the value of ￿ will allow us to consider di⁄erent degrees of
assignability in our application.
As for the current application, because assignable quantity information is not
available from the RLMS data set, our base scenario uses the observed consumption of
male and female singles (or one-person households). For example, we observe that the
average budget share of alcohol for male singles is (about) 5 times the corresponding
budget share for female singles. Given this, in the base scenario the male consumes
5/6 of all alcohol bought by the household and the female consumes 1/6. Appendix
A.3 provides a detailed description of the base scenario distribution assumed in our
analysis.
As a concluding note, we emphasize that this base scenario mainly serves illustra-
tive purposes in the present application; it enables us to mimic practical applications
with alternative degrees of assignability information. Evidently, other base scenarios
can be treated in a directly analogous manner. For example, in more extensive ap-
plications it can be useful to assess the sensitivity of consistency testing and recovery
results with respect to alternative, a priori reasonable, base scenarios. Evidently, the
lower ￿ is, the less these results will depend on the base scenario that is assumed.
245.2. Results
We ￿rst consider the empirical results for the two limiting collective consumption
models, i.e. the case in which all goods are public and the case in which all goods
are private and no assignability information is used (i.e. qAm
t = 0 for all m and t).
Table 5.2 presents pass rates in absolute terms (Pass-number) and percentage terms
(Pass-percentage) for these two models. We ￿nd that the data of all households are
consistent with both models. This suggests that these models e⁄ectively do provide
an adequate description of the observed household behavior. However, one may also
argue that the models put very little a priori structure on observed behavior, which
makes them hardly rejectable. In addition, as indicated above, one may question the
realistic nature of these ￿ extreme￿models. Indeed, it does seem unrealistic that the
21 goods are either all public or all private. Therefore, in our main analysis we will
consider the more realistic collective consumption model with some goods public and
other goods private (i.e. K = 3 and N = 21).
Before doing so, we have a quick look at the recovery results for the two limiting
models. Admittedly, given that the models imply so little a priori structure and
because we only have 8 observations per household, the recovery results are rather
weak. Still, even under these weak conditions we do ￿nd some sharing rule restrictions.
For example, for one household observation we obtain for both limiting models that
relative income shares between 40.9% and 59.1% are excluded, i.e. for the two models
we have that each household member (male or female) is responsible for either at most
40.9% of the total household income or at least 59.1% of the household income. In
this case, the implications of the two models are the same. Still, this is not the
case in general. For example, for another household observation we ￿nd that the
model with all goods public excludes relative income shares between 44.7% and 55.3%,
while there is no similar sharing rule restriction for the model with all consumption
private. As such, we conclude that recovery results are sensitive to the classi￿cation
of commodities as public or private: di⁄erent a priori assumptions regarding the
(public or private) nature of goods can imply di⁄erent sharing rule restrictions, even
if no assignable quantity information is used.
We next focus on the more realistic model with public and private goods. We
recall that wood fuel, gas fuel and housing rent are public. For the average household
in our sample, these 3 public goods account for 20.2% of the total expenditures; see
Table A.1. The remaining 18 goods are assumed to be privately consumed. For these
25Table 5.1: Consistency testing; limiting cases
Pass-number Pass-percentage
All public 148 100.00
All private (and qAm
t = 0 for all m and t) 148 100.00
privately consumed goods, we use the procedure described above (and in Appendix
A.3) to illustrate the use of assignable quantity information.
Table 5.2 presents pass rates for alternative values of ￿. Let us ￿rst consider
￿ = 1:00. This corresponds to the collective model where the within-household dis-
tribution for the 18 private goods is exactly equal to that in the hypothesized base
scenario reported in Table A.1. We ￿nd that this collective consumption model ra-
tionalizes the behavior of 137 households in our sample (i.e. about 93%). To some
extent, this gives empirical support for the base scenario that we assume.
Next, Table 5.2 also reveals that pass rates increase if ￿ decreases. This is not
surprising given that lower ￿ values comply with less assignable information for the
privately consumed quantities. For one household, we need ￿ = 0:60 for a collective
rationalization, i.e. 40% of the private quantities is not assigned. For this household,
the average budget share (de￿ned over the 8 observations) of the public goods wood
fuel, gas fuel and housing rent is 12.65%. Thus, our model rationalizes the behavior
of this household only if less than 50% of total consumption is assigned as private
consumption.
Table 5.2: Consistency testing; intermediate case






Let us then regard recovery. Given the illustrative purpose of our application, we
will not provide an exhaustive account of the recovery results for all 148 households
in our sample. Instead, we will focus on the one household that needs ￿ = 0:60
26for a collective rationalization.9 Obviously, higher ￿ values generally obtain more
precise recovery (i.e. tighter set identi￿cation). Therefore, we believe the results for
this lowest ￿ value in our application are most illustrative for the potential of the
methodology; higher ￿ values can only reveal ￿ better￿(i.e. more precise) recovery
performance.
Table 5.3 presents sharing rule recovery for the household under consideration.
It gives upper and lower bounds on the relative income shares for the male member
and the female member in each of the 8 household observations. We observe that in
2 out of the 8 observations the bounds are fairly tight: the di⁄erence between the
upper and lower bounds is less than 7 percentage points in observation 2, and about
2 percentage points in observation 7. In our opinion, this is quite remarkable given
￿ = 0:60 and an average budget share of the public goods equal to 12.65%. Also,
our results reveal a rather drastic shift in the relative income share (or bargaining
power) between observations 2 and 7: in observation 2 the male member (member 1)
was responsible for only about 30% of the household income, while his income share
increases to about 70% in observation 7. Subsequent analysis may try to explain
such shifts in relative income shares by relating it to speci￿c household (member)
characteristics, or -speci￿c to this application- to the dramatic economic changes in
Russia in the period under consideration (compare with Lacroix and Radtchenko,
2008). Such an analysis falls beyond the scope of the current study, but we will
provide a general discussion on this type of applications in the concluding section.
In our opinion, the fact that our methodology enables us to draw such conclu-
sions with only few observations and relatively little assignable quantity information
clearly suggests the potential of nonparametric recovery analysis. Interestingly, our
methodology allows for such analysis while accounting for public consumption in the
household. Generally, we can expect recovery results to become more precise when
more assignable information is available. This indicates the usefulness of including
such information in household budget surveys. Of course, not only the assignable
quantity information, but also the number of observations determines the precision of
the recovery results. Generally, additional data will yield more stringent data consis-
tency conditions and thus also more precise recovery results. As data sets with more
observations become increasingly available, we can thus expect such more powerful
9Recovery results for other households are available from the authors upon request.
27analyses in future applications.
Table 5.3: Sharing rule recovery; example
Household observation Male share Female share
lower bound upper bound lower bound upper bound
1 0.333 0.733 0.267 0.667
2 0.274 0.342 0.658 0.727
3 0.279 0.679 0.321 0.721
4 0.103 0.870 0.130 0.897
5 0.297 0.697 0.303 0.703
6 0.169 0.796 0.204 0.831
7 0.704 0.727 0.273 0.296
8 0.290 0.703 0.297 0.710
6. Summary and concluding discussion
We have presented an integer programming (IP) methodology for nonparametric ￿ re-
vealed preference￿analysis of collective consumption models. This methodology ap-
plies to collective models that account for publicly as well as privately consumed
goods and that incorporate the possibility of assignable quantity information. The
methodology allows for testing data consistency with speci￿c collective consumption
models. In addition, it enables us to recover/identify (sets of) feasible personalized
prices (for publicly consumed goods), feasible personalized quantities (for privately
consumed goods) and feasible income shares (i.e. the sharing rule) that are consis-
tent with observed collectively rational behavior. The methodology applies to any
number of group members and any number of observed group consumption choices
(i.e. quantities and prices).
Our numerical examples show that, in principle, precise nonparametric recovery
(i.e. tight set identi￿cation) can be obtained even if no assignable quantity informa-
tion is available. Next, our empirical application to RLMS data suggests that ad-
ditional assignable quantity information generally entails a more powerful empirical
analysis (i.e. more stringent data consistency conditions and tighter set identi￿ca-
tion). Also, we can expect data sets with more observations to entail a more powerful
analysis. In this respect, we note that data sets with more observations and more
28assignable quantity information become increasingly available. Thus, we can expect
our methodology to be particularly useful in combination with such data sets.
As for future applications of the methodology, we indicate that recovery of the
feasible personalized prices, personalized quantities and income shares in turn allows
for empirically addressing welfare-related issues that are speci￿c to the collective con-
sumption model. As indicated in the introduction, the collective approach is partic-
ularly useful for investigating questions that pertain to the within-group distribution
of the group income (i.e. the sharing rule). The methodology presented in this study
paves the way for empirically addressing these issues in a nonparametric manner. The
few existing studies of these issues persistently used parametric speci￿cations of the
collective model.
In this respect, we distinguish at least three di⁄erent types of welfare-related
applications of collective consumption models that build on sharing rule recovery.
A ￿rst type of applications focuses on explaining variations in the sharing rule by
relating it to speci￿c household (member) characteristics; see, for example, Browning,
Bourguignon, Chiappori and Lechene (1994). A second type of applications ￿ts in the
￿ targeting view￿of Blundell, Chiappori and Meghir (2005), which takes as a starting
point that the e⁄ectiveness of a speci￿c bene￿t or tax also depends on the particular
group (e.g. household) member to whom it has been targeted. These authors argue
that a unitary set-up, which implicitly assumes income pooling at the aggregate
group level, fails to adequately deal with such targeting considerations. A ￿nal type
of applications analyzes welfare at the individual group member level rather than at
the aggregate group level. For example, Browning, Chiappori and Lewbel (2006) and
Lewbel and Pendakur (2008) suggest a collective approach for comparing the cost-
of-living of individuals living alone with the one of the same individuals living in a
multi-member household.
Appendix
A.1. Proof of Proposition 1
Varian (1982) has proven equivalence between conditions (ii) and (iii), so we can
restrict to proving equivalence between conditions (i) and (iii).
291. Necessity. Under condition (i), we have that each (qm




























t Um:10 An optimal solution to the above maximization problem
















t a subgradient of the function Um de￿ned for the vector qm and evaluated at
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Substituting (6.1) in (6.2) and setting Um
k = Um (qm
k ;Qk) (k = s;t) obtains con-
dition (iii) of the proposition.











































Varian (1982) proves that Um (qm
t ;Qt) = Um
t . Next, given ￿m
t 2 R++, we have
10To be precise, ￿Um (m = 1;:::;M) is convex and therefore subdi⁄erentiable. This, of course,









































Without losing generality, we concentrate on ￿m
t = (1=￿
m












































































tQt. We conclude that the functions Um in (6.3) provide a collective
rationalization of the set S. These functions have the properties listed in condition
(i) of the proposition (compare with Varian, 1982).
A.2. Proof of Proposition 2
1. Necessity. Suppose there exist feasible personalized prices and quantities such
that for each member m = 1; :::; M, the set f(pt;Pm
t ;qm
t ;Qt); t = 1;:::;Tg sat-





constraints (i)-(vi) in Proposition 2. First, constraints (i)-(iii) are satis￿ed because
the feasible personalized prices, quantities and income shares are consistent with De-
￿nitions 1, 3 and 5. Next, to see consistency with constraints (iv)-(vi), consider


























another sequence does not impose restrictions on xm
st.) Constraint (iv) then im-
plies xm
su = xm
uv = ::: = xm
zt = 1, and constraint (v) consequently obtains xm
st = 1.
Constraint (vi) is then automatically satis￿ed because the set f(pt;Pm
t ;qm
t ;Qt);


































0 Qt (which corresponds to (qm
s ;Qs) Rm (qm
t ;Qt)).




st that satisfy constraints (i)-(vi)
in Proposition 2, then there exist feasible personalized prices and quantities such
that for each member m = 1; :::; M, the set f(pt;Pm
t ;qm
t ;Qt); t = 1;:::;Tg satis￿es
GARP. We prove ad absurdum. Suppose that for any speci￿cation of the feasible
personalized prices and quantities that satisfy constraints (i)-(vi) in Proposition 2 we
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0 Qt. In terms of the constraints (i)-(vi), this
means that there always exists a sequence (u; v; :::; z) such that, on the one hand,
xm
su = xm
uv = ::: = xm
zt = 1 (because of constraint (iv)) and thus xm
st = 1 (because of









thus constraint (vi) is violated. This contradiction completes the proof.
32A.3. Data summary
Table A.1: Data
Good Average budget share for Male share in Female share in
two-person households base scenario (s1
n) base scenario (s2
n)
Food outside the home 0.029 0.638 0.362
Clothing 0.073 0.275 0.725
Car fuel 0.054 0.856 0.144
Wood fuel 0.034 (public)
Gas fuel 0.022 (public)
Luxury goods 0.018 0.675 0.325
Services 0.191 0.436 0.564
Housing rent 0.146 (public)
Bread 0.103 0.483 0.517
Potatoes 0.010 0.393 0.607
Vegetables 0.018 0.312 0.688
Fruit 0.013 0.406 0.594
Meat 0.093 0.544 0.456
Dairy products 0.047 0.371 0.629
Fat 0.025 0.396 0.604
Sugar 0.047 0.473 0.527
Eggs 0.011 0.532 0.468
Fish 0.016 0.405 0.595
Other food 0.017 0.510 0.490
Alcohol 0.014 0.837 0.163
Tobacco 0.016 0.992 0.008
The construction of s1
n and s2
n in Table A.1. As explained in the main text, in
our application we construct the base scenario by using the data that are available
for (male and female) singles (or one-person households): we consider average budget
shares for male and female singles as obtained from the same RLMS data set. Specif-
ically, let member 1 be the male in the household and member 2 the female, and let
w1
n and w2
n represent the (mean) budget share of the private good n for a single male
and a single female, respectively. Then, we de￿ne the male quantities qB1
t and the
33female quantities qB2



































Intuitively, the value of s1
n (s2
n) indicates the relative importance of good n in the
consumption pattern of the male (female). For example, suppose w1
n=w2
n = ￿n, so
that ￿n re￿ ects the relative importance of good n for the male as compared to the
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